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1 Modal monism and anti-exceptionalism
A widespread philosophical view about modality holds that there exists only
one kind of necessity and possibility, to which all other kinds are to be re-
duced. The view is often called modal monism, and it has been expressed
perhaps most famously by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus: “The only neces-
sity that exists is logical necessity. (6.37) “Just as the only necessity that
exists is logical necessity, so too the only impossibility that exists is logical
impossibility.” (6.375) According to this view, that is physically possible
which is logically consistent with the laws of nature.
A similar view, according to which metaphysical and physical modal-
ity “stand or fall” together, has been more recently defended by Timothy
Williamson: “In given circumstances, a proposition is nomically possible
if and only if it is metaphysically compossible with what, in those circum-
stances, are the laws of nature (their conjunction is metaphysically possi-
ble).” (Williamson (2016), 455) Thus, nomical or physical possibility can-
not be explained independently of metaphysical possibility.
It seems natural to take modal monism to provide support to Williamson’s
anti-exceptionalism about metaphysics, in general, and about the metaphysics
of modality, in particular, which is expressed in the following way: “We
should not treat the metaphysics and epistemology of metaphysical modality
in isolation from the metaphysics and epistemology of the natural sciences.”
(ibid, 453) For if physical modality is explained in terms of metaphysical
modality, then this anti-exceptionalist requirement is arguably satisfied.
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In an earlier book, wherein Williamson mounts a defense of a meta-
physical view he calls necessitism, i.e., the view that necessarily everything
is such that necessarily something is identical with it, he similarly affirms
anti-exceptionalism, which is here expressed somewhat differently: “We
will be guided throughout this book by a conception of theories in logic and
metaphysics as scientific theories, to be assessed by the same overall stan-
dards as theories in other branches of science.” (Williamson (2013), 27)1
These anti-exceptionalist declarations are meant to stand on their own, with
no support from modal monism, which does not seem to be part of the pic-
ture yet: “Metaphysical possibility will not be assumed to be metaphysically
basic, or fundamental, or irreducible, or perfectly natural, or anything like
that.” (ibid, 3, footnote 4)
Adopting scientific standards for the assessment of the metaphysics of
metaphysical modality might be enough to ensure that this is not treated
in isolation from the metaphysics of physical modality. The present paper
argues, however, that modal monism should stay out of the picture, for it
cannot add anything to support such treatment. The reason for this is that
modal monism is false.
To be sure, modal monism has its own detractors within the field of ana-
lytic metaphysics (see, e.g., Fine (2005), for an argument in favor of modal
pluralism). Here I will construct an argument against modal monism based
on a technical result in the metatheory of quantum logic that has implica-
tions for our understanding of what quantum mechanics deems physically
possible. To show that modal monism is false, I provide a counterexample
to Williamson’s reduction of physical possibility to metaphysical possibil-
ity. That is, I argue that there are propositions that quantum mechanics
deems physically possible, but which are not metaphysically compossible
with what in some circumstances are the laws of nature.
I start by providing some details about the quantum logical interpreta-
tion, or as I shall call it (following Stairs (2015)) the quantum logical recon-
struction of quantum mechanics, enough to make intelligible the presenta-
tion of a technical result (due to Pavicˇic´ and Megill (1999)) that establishes
the non-categoricity of quantum logic (where a logic will be called categor-
ical with respect to an isomorphism class of structures if and only if all its
models are in that class).
1The point is recalled towards the end of the book: “[T]he methodology of this book is akin
to that of a natural science. [...] The theories are judged partly on their strength, simplicity,
and elegance, partly on the fit between their consequences and what is independently known.”
(ibid, 423)
2
A Note on Williamson’s Modal Monism
Afterwards I discuss the connection between this metatheoretical result
and what quantum mechanics reveals about modality, suggesting an account
of physical possibility that is independent of metaphysical possibility. Then
I come back to modal monism to explain why I believe it is false, but also
to reject an objection that might be raised against my argument, an objec-
tion that insists against taking the laws of quantum logic as laws of nature.
An elaboration and defense of modal pluralism in the context of quantum
mechanics will, however, be deferred to another paper.
2 Quantum logic and orthomodular lattices
This section briefly introduces the standard approach to quantum logic and
its semantics constructed in terms of orthomodular lattices. In doing so, it
assumes the standard Hilbert space formalism of quantum mechanics. Thus,
as is usual, the pure states of a quantum system are taken to be represented
by unit vectors in an associated Hilbert space that represents the state space
of the system, and quantum properties to be represented by linear closed
subspaces of the Hilbert space.2
Let QL be a formal language that contains an infinite set of formulas,
p, q, ..., and three symbols for logical connectives,∼,∧,∨ (that is, for nega-
tion, conjunction, and disjunction, respectively) such that if p and q are sen-
tences in QL, then ∼ p, p ∧ q, and p ∨ q are also in QL.3 The semantics of
this formal language is typically given by an ortholattice, which can be de-
fined as an algebraic structure LA, i.e., a set of elements, a, b, ... (which are
precisely the linear closed subspaces of a Hilbert space) together with the
operations ′,∩,∪ (for orthocomplementation, join, and meet, respectively),
such that any elements a, b, c in that set satisfy conditions like the following:
a ∩ b = b ∩ a
a ∩ (b ∩ c) = (a ∩ b) ∩ c
a ∩ (a ∪ b) = a
a = a′′
(a ∩ a′) ∩ b = a ∩ a′
a ∪ b = (a′ ∩ b′)′
2For reference, see any standard introduction to quantum mechanics and its logical-
algebraic formalism, e.g. Beltrametti and Cassinelli (1981).
3One can also define a variety of implication connectives. For a brief review, see Pavicˇic´
(2016). The first to define different quantum implications was Weyl (1940).
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One further defines a supremum 1 := a ∪ a′, an infimum 0 := a ∩ a′,
and a partial order a ≤ b := a ∩ b = a, a ≤ b := a ∪ b = b, as well as
an equivalence relation a ≡ b := (a ∩ b) ∪ (a′ ∩ b′). Then, an ortholattice
LA is said to be a model of QL if and only if for any sentences p, q in QL
and any elements a, b of LA there is a map h : QL −→ LA, such that the
following three conditions are satisfied:
h(∼ p) = h(p)′ = a′
h(p ∨ q) = h(p) ∪ h(q) = a ∪ b
h(p ∧ q) = h(p) ∩ h(q) = a ∩ b
The map h is a homomorphism, i.e., it preserves operational structure,
by mapping negation to orthocomplementation, disjunction to join, and con-
junction to meet. Thus, the algebraic relations between linear closed sub-
spaces of the Hilbert space (i.e., the equations involving the ortholattice
operations) are expressed by sentences of the formal language QL, and are
typically taken to represent compatibility relations between the properties of
a quantum system (i.e., their co-measurability). But, of course, not all alge-
braic relations will do so, since in quantum mechanics not all properties of
a system are co-measurable. In particular, distributivity, that is, the law ac-
cording to which, for any elements a, b, c ∈ LA, a∩(b∪c) = (a∩b)∪(a∩c),
is usually taken to fail in quantum mechanics. As a result, weaker versions
of distributivity have been considered, one of which is modularity.
A lattice is modular if and only if the law of modularity holds: if a ≤ c,
then a ∩ (b ∪ c) = (a ∩ b) ∪ (a ∩ c). As von Neumann first realized,
however, modularity requires a finite dimensional Hilbert space, which he
thought was improper for a truly general quantum logic.4 A further weak-
ening of distributivity leads to orthomodularity. A lattice is orthomodular if
and only if the law of orthomodularity holds: if a ≤ b, then b = a∪ (a′∩ b).
Orthomodular lattices give the standard algebraic semantics of the quantum
logical calculus QL. Thus, the homomorphism h, as defined above, maps
sentences from QL to compatibility relations between the elements of an
orthomodular structure of quantum properties.
4This is the reason von Neumann came to give up the Hilbert space formalism several years
after he had introduced it. See the quotation at the end of the paper. For a detailed discussion,
see e.g. Rédei (1996).
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3 Non-categoricity and physical possibility
Having described these basic facts about quantum logic and its algebraic se-
mantics, I turn now to a (so far unduly neglected) result in the metatheory of
quantum logic, which shows that quantum logic is non-categorical (Pavicˇic´
and Megill (1999), Pavicˇic´ and Megill (2009)). More precisely, it is non-
categorical with respect to the isomorphism class of orthomodular lattices,
because one can show that not all its algebraic models are in this class: “one
of its models is an orthomodular lattice, while others are nonorthomodular
lattices.” (Pavicˇic´ (2016), 2)
Nonorthomodular lattices are those in which the law of orthomodular-
ity fails. Some of these nonorthomodular lattices, however, obey a weak-
ened form of orthomodularity, appropriately called weak orthomodularity.
To see what the law of weak orthomodularity states, consider an alterna-
tive definition of orthomodularity: a lattice is orthomodular if and only if
for any elements a, b ∈ LA, a ≡ b = 1 ⇒ a = b. That is, two ele-
ments of an orthomodular lattice are equivalent (in the sense of equivalence
defined above) only if they are the same element. A weakly orthomod-
ular, nonorthomodular lattice is then one in which for any a, b, c ∈ LA,
a ≡ b = 1⇒ (a ∪ c) ≡ (b ∪ c) = 1. In other words, such a lattice includes
distinct elements that are indiscernible via orthomodularity.5
What Pavicˇic´ and Megill have proved, more precisely, is that there exists
an orthomodular lattice, as well as a weakly orthomodular, non-orthomodular
lattice, such that the quantum logical propositional calculus is sound and
complete with respect to both.6 One interpretation, proposed by Pavicˇic´, is
that quantum logic “can simultaneously describe distinct realities” (Pavicˇic´
(2016), 2). What this means, I take it, is that quantum logic can associate
distinct compatibility structures of properties with one and the same quan-
tum system: both an orthomodular structure, and a weakly orthomodular,
nonorthomodular one.
5It might help to compare this to first-order Peano arithmetic: a nonstandard model includes
distinct elements – nonstandard numbers – that are indiscernible by the application of the rules
of the theory within its language.
6Related claims concerning the semantics of quantum logic were expressed first by Weyl,
who pointed out that Birkhoff and von Neumann’s quantum logic allows non-unique valuations
of disjunctive and conjunctive formulas (Weyl (1940)). For discussion, see Toader (2020a). See
Hellman (1980) for a proof that quantum logical connectives are not truth-functional. For an
application of the non-truth-functional semantics developed by Arnon Avron and his collabo-




This raises a couple of question, which I better attempt to answer now
before I even formulate my argument against modal monism. First, one
may point out that non-categoricity is an artefact of the quantum logical
reconstruction of quantum mechanics, rather than a logical feature of the
physical theory itself. Secondly, one may insist that one should reject a non-
categorical theory as possessing an undesirable metatheoretical property.
To the first question: one should recall that the purpose of the quantum
logical reconstruction is to reveal the logical structure of quantum mechan-
ics – the very objective stated by Birkhoff and von Neumann already in
1936: “to discover what logical structure one may hope to find in phys-
ical theories which, like quantum mechanics, do not conform to classical
logic.”7 Thus, to the extent that quantum logic succeeded in at least approx-
imating the logical structure of quantum mechanics, and there is no serious
reason to doubt that this is the case, its non-categoricity entails that quan-
tum mechanics associates distinct compatibility structures of properties with
a quantum system. In other words, quantum mechanics tells us that physical
reality can be either an orthomodular ortholattice or a weakly orthomodu-
lar, nonorthomodular one. Despite the fact that quantum logic cannot itself
be considered a physical theory, it is nevertheless physically salient because
one of its metatheoretical properties has implications for our understanding
of what quantum mechanics deems physically possible.8
To the second question: that one should characterize a non-categorical
theory as semantically defective, as possessing an undesirable metatheo-
retical property, seems justified. Witness the many attempts to prove that
theories like arithmetic and set theory are categorical, on the assumption
that non-categoricity is a liability, one that implies for example the seman-
tic indeterminacy of the languages of these theories, their inability to pick
out their intended semantics.9 However, from a metatheoretical perspective,
there is arguably a significant difference between non-physical theories and
physical ones like quantum mechanics. The categoricity of the latter has
been long rejected as a kind of undesirable rigidity that unduly constrains
its applicability.10
7Birkhoff and von Neumann (1936), 823. See also Suppes (1966).
8The categoricity problem of quantum mechanics is discussed at length in Toader (2020b)
9See, for discussion, Button and Walsh (2018).
10Consider, e.g., the following view: “A categorical theory is one such that any two models
(true interpretations) of its underlying abstract formalism are isomorphic (structurally iden-
tical). Now a necessary condition for theory isomorphism is that the corresponding sets be
similar, i.e. that there be a one-to-one correspondence between them. But we do not want such
6
A Note on Williamson’s Modal Monism
More recently, non-categoricity appears to be considered as a theoreti-
cal advantage of a physical theory: “A theory that underdetermines its own
interpretation is like a healthy breeding population: it has a shot at enough
diversity to ... meet the variety of demands its scientific environment places
on it.” (Ruetsche (2011), 355) One sometimes speaks, very aptly, of “in-
tended non-categoricity” (Rédei (2014), 80) to characterize the intention of
the physicist to construct physical theories that allow for non-isomorphic
models.
One fundamental idea underlying these evaluations of non-categoricity
is that the non-isomorphic models of a physical theory represent distinct
physical possibilities. This suggests a semantic account of physical modal-
ity, according to which a proposition is physically possible if and only if it is
true in at least one model of a physical theory. This idea, I submit, should be
understood as the basis for an independent account of physical possibility,
i.e., one that does not reduce physical possibility to another kind of possi-
bility, like metaphysical possibility. For on this account, a proposition may
be considered physically possible independently of what is metaphysically
compossible with what, in any circumstances, are the laws of nature. What
is physically possible depends only on metatheory. But what holds at the
metatheoretical level, i.e., that a proposition in the language of a physical
theory is true in at least one model of that theory, need not be logically con-
sistent with what the theory takes to be the laws of nature. This account
represents a move towards modal pluralism.
4 Against Modal Monism
I think that everything is now in place for a presentation of my argument
against Williamson’s modal monism, an argument that draws, as already
announced, on the non-categoricity of the quantum logical formalism. So
let p be a sentence in QL that expresses a proposition h(p) which holds in
a weakly orthomodular, nonorthomodular structure of quantum properties,
and let’s assume that h(p) entails weak orthomodularity, but not the negation
of orthomodularity. Similarly, let q be a sentence in QL that expresses
a proposition h(q) which holds in an orthomodular structure of quantum
properties, and let’s assume that h(q) entails orthomodularity.
a rigidity in physics for, even if two theories do have formally identical basic formulas (e.g.
wave equations), they may refer to entirely different kinds of physical systems, these kinds
being conceptualised as sets that need not be similar.” (Bunge (1973), 166)
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According to the independent account of physical modality, sketched
above, each of h(p) and h(q) is physically possible, for each is true in at
least one structure, i.e., h(p) is true in a weakly orthomodular, nonortho-
modular lattice, and h(q) is true in an orthomodular lattice. This situation
obtains because, as argued above, quantum logic is non-categorical, i.e.,
these two mutually non-isomorphic ortholattices are provably in the class
of its models. From a quantum-mechanical point of view then, there is no
reason to dismiss either h(p) or h(q) as a physical impossibility.
But recall that, according to Williamson’s modal monism, that is physi-
cally possible which is metaphysically compossible with what in some cir-
cumstances are the laws of nature. So take the following circumstances: an
orthomodular structure of quantum properties – an orthomodular world, as
it were. On Williamson’s view, then, h(q) would be physically possible,
since it is logically consistent, and thus metaphysically compossible, with
the laws of an orthomodular world: by assumption, h(q) entails orthomod-
ularity. Furthermore, h(p) would be physically possible as well, since it is
logically consistent, and thus metaphysically compossible, with the laws of
an orthomodular world: by assumption, h(p) does not entail the negation of
orthomodularity.
So far, so good. Nevertheless, consider now the following, different
circumstances: a weakly orthomodular, nonorthomodular structure of quan-
tum properties – a weakly orthomodular, nonorthomodular world, that is.
On Williamson’s view, h(p) would be physically possible, since it is log-
ically consistent, and thus metaphysically compossible, with the laws of a
weakly orthomodular, nonorthomodular world: by assumption, h(p) entails
weak orthomodularity. However, on the same view, h(q) would turn out to
be physically impossible, because h(q) is not metaphysically compossible
with the laws of a weakly orthomodular, nonorthomodular world, since their
conjunction is logically inconsistent: by assumption, h(q) entails orthomod-
ularity.
It follows from all this that there are propositions which quantum me-
chanics deems physically possible, but which according to Williamson’s
modal monism are not metaphysically compossible with what, in some cir-
cumstances, are the laws of nature. This, I think, constitutes a sufficient
reason for rejecting the reduction of physical possibility to metaphysical
possibility, which characterizes modal monism, at least in the version that
appears to be advocated by Williamson. Furthermore, insofar as it is actu-
ally based on modal monism, his anti-exceptionalism about the metaphysics
of metaphysical modality turns out to be improperly justified.
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One may object that orthomodularity and weak orthomodularity cannot
be considered laws of nature (Mittelstaedt (2012)). If so, the above would
not really provide a counterexample to Williamson’s reduction of physical
possibility to metaphysical possibility. This objection raises, of course, a
more general question: what are the laws of nature according to quantum
mechanics? Typically, laws of nature are supposed to express relations be-
tween the states of a physical system, relations that allow us to make testable
predictions about the states of a system. So the laws of nature are typically
dynamical laws, as they describe trajectories through the state space associ-
ated with a system. But in quantum logic, of course, there are no dynamical
laws, there is no expression of Schrödinger’s equation.
This may be considered as a shortcoming of the quantum logical recon-
struction of quantum mechanics, but only if one assumes that any recon-
struction must describe the dynamics. This, however, has never been the
purpose of quantum logic. As mentioned above, that purpose was to un-
cover the logical structure of quantum mechanics, the compatibility struc-
ture of properties possessed by a quantum system. But a dynamical law
does not tell us anything about exactly what quantum properties are com-
patible (i.e., co-measurable). In the quantum logical reconstruction, as von
Neumann emphasized in a famous letter, the focus is not on the states of a
system any more, but on its properties: “I would like to make a confession
which may seem immoral: I do not believe absolutely in Hilbert space any
more. ... Now we begin to believe, that ... it is not the vectors which matter
but the lattice of all linear (closed) subspaces. Because: ... the states are
merely a derived notion, the primitive (phenomenologically given) notion
being the qualities, which correspond to the linear closed subspaces.” (von
Neumann to Birkhoff, November 6, 1935)
Orthomodularity and weak orthomodularity are laws of nature in the
sense that they describe compatibility relations between quantum proper-
ties. These are not dynamical laws, since they do not describe trajectories
through state space, but they allow us to predict what properties of a sys-
tem are compatible in certain circumstances. The law of orthomodularity,
for example, tells us that no measurement undertaken in an orthomodular
world can reveal an instance of an nonorthomodular compatibility structure
of properties. It can furthermore be easily seen that such laws support coun-
terfactuals. Thus, the difference between orthomodular and weakly ortho-
modular, nonorthomodular worlds is not merely factual, but nomological.
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